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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's decision affirming the magistrate's dismissal of 
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition"). The Petition alleged that the Idaho 
Commission of Pardons and Parole ("Parole Commission") violated Appellant's constitutional 
rights in the course ofrevoking his parole. 
B. Procedural History 
Appellant, Terrence J. Matthews ("Matthews"), filed his Petition on October 30, 2006. 
(R., p. l .) On January 5, 2007, Respondents filed a Response and Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R., p. 137.) On February 14, 2007, counsel for Matthews entered an appearance in 
this action. (R., Register of Actions, p. I.) Subsequently, the parties submitted additional 
briefing regarding the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., pp. 155, 164.) The 
magistrate heard oral argument on April 16, 2007, and issued his Order Dismissing Petition for 
Habeas Corpus ("Magistrate's Order") on May 4, 2007. (R., p. 173.) Matthews filed a Notice of 
Appeal on June l 1, 2007. (R., p. 198.) 
The parties then filed their respective briefs (R., pp. 202,210, 221 ), and oral argument 
was heard by the district court on January 7, 2008. (R., Register of Actions, p. 2.) On January 
24, 2008, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the 
Magistrate's dismissal of Matthews' Petition. (R., p. 225.) Matthews filed his Notice of Appeal 
on March l 2, 2008. (R., p. 232.) 
--···-- -~- ·- .L - -- --- -- ----- -
C. Statement of Facts 
The Magistrate's Order accurately describes the relevant facts as follows: 
On November 27, 1991, Petitioner was convicted oflewd conduct with a minor 
and sexual abuse of a minor. Petitioner was sentenced concurrently to a minimum 
of five ( 5) years and an additional ten (10) years indeterminate. 
In October I 996, Petitioner was released on parole. In February 2002, the Parole 
Commission revoked Petitioner's parole based upon Petitioner's violation of the 
terms of parole. 
On May 9, 2002, Petitioner was once again placed on parole. At the time of his 
parole on May 9, 2002, Petitioner agreed in writing to follow certain conditions of 
parole which included seven special conditions. On May 13, 2002, Petitioner 
signed a Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision. 
On November 15, 2002, the Petitioner's supervising parole officer issued a 
special progress report and request for warning letter regarding Petitioner's 
presence in a bar against the terms of his parole. On November 30, 2002, the 
Parole Commission issued a warning letter. In response, Petitioner signed an 
agreement which, in part, provided, "I agree to conform strictly to the conditions 
of my Parole Agreement. I understand that should new information come to light 
regarding the November 15, 2002 report or another parole violation occurs, the 
information contained in the November 15, 2002 report can be used against me in 
a future parole violation." 
Petitioner was given verbal instructions to address non-compliant behavior on 
June 25, 2002, July 8, 2002, July 11, 2002, July 12, 2002, July 18, 2002, and 
August 6, 2002. On March 5, 2003, Petitioner was transferred to the Close 
Custody Treatment Unit to "better monitor his manipulative behavior, alleged 2nd 
incident of stalking, and other Parole Compliance issues." On March 12, 2003, 
Petitioner signed a Close Community Supervision Agreement of Supervision. On 
July 26, 2005, Petitioner signed a Behavioral Contract. On July 28, 2005, 
Petitioner also signed another Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision and 
Supplemental Parole Conditions. 
Matters came to a head in July 2005. A search of Petitioner's residence found a 
child's shoes and Fisher Price toy in his bedroom as well as a small doll in his 
vehicle. In July 2005, Petitioner disclosed that his son lived with him for a month 
without Petitioner seeking the necessary permission. 
On July 28, 2005, a polygraph examination was conducted. The expert 
administering the polygraph believed Petitioner to be deceptive as to his 
unsupervised contacts with minors. Petitioner disclosed to the polygrapher that he 
had several unsupervised contacts with minors including allowing a woman and 
her young daughter to live with him for two weeks. Petitioner had not informed 
his probation officers of these contacts despite requests of him for such 
information. 
On July 29, 2005, Petitioner was arrested on an Agent's Warrant for violating the 
terms and conditions of his parole. Specifically, Petitioner was arrested for the 
following parole violations: failure to submit regular written reports to his parole 
officer; failure to follow instructions from parole officer; leaving his assigned 
district without written permission; failure to abstain from drugs and alcohol, 
failure to avoid businesses where alcohol is the main source of income; failure to 
obtain a substance abuse evaluation; failure to comply with sex offender 
treatment; and associating with minor children without approved supervision. 
Petitioner's preliminary hearing regarding his alleged parole violations was 
scheduled for August 3, 2005. The preliminary hearing was continued until 
August 10, 2005, at Petitioner's request in order for him to seek legal 
representation. The preliminary hearing was continued again until August 16, 
2005 at the request of Petitioner's attorney. 
On August 16, 2005, the preliminary hearing was conducted with Petitioner and 
his attorney present. The officer conducting the preliminary hearing found 
probable cause for the alleged violations of Petitioner's conditions of parole. A 
copy of the Preliminary Hearing Report was provided to Petitioner on August 18, 
2005. 
Petitioner's parole violation hearing was scheduled for September 12, 2005 and 
October 5, 2005 and continued both times at Petitioner's request. The hearing 
was held on October 21, 2005. Petitioner was advised prior to the hearing of his 
rights including the right to present witnesses and evidence, the right to subpoena 
witnesses, and the right to be represented. Petitioner was represented by legal 
counsel. 
The Parole Commission Hearing Officer in an eighteen ( 18) page decision found 
Petitioner to have committed all of the alleged violation, except for the alleged 
failure to obtain a substance abuse evaluation. The Hearing Officer recommended 
that Petitioner's parole be revoked. The Hearing Officer commented of 
Petitioner, "He appears to put more time and effort into lying to people and 
manipulating them than on developing attributes of honesty and respect for 
others." The Hearing Officer issued her written decision on January 3, 2006. 
The Parole Commission scheduled a revocation or disposition hearing for 
February l, 2006. The hearing was continued to March 15, 2006 at Petitioner's 
request to enable him to have his attorney present. The March 15, 2006 hearing 
had to be continued because Petitioner became hysterical and could not get 
himself under control. The revocation hearing was continued until April 13, 
2006. Petitioner was again represented by an attorney at the hearing. 
The Parole Commission adopted the findings of the Hearing Officer for the parole 
violation hearing and revoked Petitioner's parole. The Parole Commission 
observed in their April 13, 2006 decision, "It is obviously clear that he is not a 
safe risk in the community due to his decisions not to follow any rules pertinent to 
his crime. He will not work his treatment program .... Subject is being 
considered for a Violent Sexual Predator designation." Although testimony was 
taken, the Parole Commission expressly noted that "the reasons of the 
Commission for revoking and denying parole are based solely on the findings of 
the Hearing Officer, not on testimony from any witnesses at this Revocation 
hearing." 
(R., pp. 174-178) (citations omitted). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Matthews raises nine (9) issues on appeal. Respondents restate those issues as follows: 
l) Did the magistrate abuse his discretion by dismissing Matthews' Petition without 
holding an evidentiary hearing? 
2) Did the parole revocation proceedings violate Matthews' right to due process? 
3) Did revocation of Matthews' parole violate his rights against double jeopardy or cruel 
and unusual punishment? 
4) Can Matthews present an ineffective assistance of counsel elairn in this appeal'/ 
4·---··-------·. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
When the district court acts in its appellate capacity: 
The St1preme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's 
findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those 
findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom 
and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the 
district court's decision as a matter of procedure. 
Nicholls v. Blaser, I 02 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981); Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 
670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008). 
The decision to issue a writ of habeas corpus is a matter within the discretion of the 
magistrate court. Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123, 127,376 P.2d 704 (1962); Brennan v. State, 
122 ldaho 911,914,841 P.2d 441 (Ct. App. 1992). In reviewing the exercise of discretion in a 
habeas corpus proceeding, the reviewing court conducts a three-tiered inquiry to determine 
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion, and reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Brennan, 122 
Idaho at 9 I 4; Sivak v. Aa'a County, 115 Idaho 762, 763, 769 P.2d 1134 (Ct. App. 1989). If a 
petitioner is not entitled to relief on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the decision of the 
lower court to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing will be upheld. Brennan, 122 
Idaho at 917. 
Additionally, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to habeas corpus 
proceedings. Sivak v. Ada County, 118 Idaho 193, 795 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1990); Idaho Code § 
19-4208. The standard for summary judgment is as folJows: 
When the Supreme Court reviews a district court's decision on summary 
judgment, it employs the same standard as that properly employed by the trial 
court when originally ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is proper "if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Finally, this 
Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and 
will draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in 
favor of the party opposing the motion. 
McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,152,937 P.2d 1222 (1997) (citations omitted). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion By Dismissing Matthews' Petition 
Without Holding An Evidentiary Hearing. 
The overarching theme presented by Matthews throughout this proceeding is that the 
magistrate abused his discretion by not affording Matthews an evidentiary hearing. As explained 
below, and supported by the record, the magistrate did not abuse his discretion. 
1. The magistrate had proper jurisdiction over the Petition. 
As a preliminary matter, Matthews appears to argue that the magistrate did not have 
jurisdiction to dispose of the Petition. Appellant's Brief, pp. 31-32. This claim is without merit. 
First, Matthews did not raise his jurisdictional issue below. Therefore, he is precluded from 
raising the issue for the first time on appeal. See Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573,580, 21 P.3d 895 
(2001) (court "will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.") 
Even assuming that Matthews may challenge the magistrate's jurisdiction on appeal, his 
argument fails as a matter of law. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2)(E), "when approved by the 
administrative district judge of a judicial district" magistrates have jurisdiction over "[a]ll habeas 
corpus proceedings regardless of the nature or origin." In turn, the rules for the Second Judicial 
District provide that "[t]he Magistrate Judges of the 2nd Judicial District are given jurisdiction 
over all matters designated in ... Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 82(c)(I) and !RCP 82(c)(2)." 
Second District Rules for Court Management and Jurisdiction of Magistrate Judges, Idaho State 
Bar Desk Book (2008-2009), p. 172. Therefore, the magistrate was properly delegated 
jurisdiction to resolve Matthews' Petition. Furthermore, Matthews waived any objection to the 
magistrate by failing to file a written objection before the commencement of any hearing. 
1.R.C.P. 82(c)(3). 
2. The magistrate did not abuse his discretion by dismissing the Petition. 
Matthews contends that the magistrate abused his discretion by dismissing Matthews' 
Petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Appellant's Brief, p. 30. Specifically, Matthews 
asserts that the Parole Commission's decision to revoke his parole and forfeit his parole time was 
not supported by substantial evidence. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-16. Therefore, according to 
Matthews, the magistrate should have convened an evidentiary hearing to address the alleged 
factual shortcomings. As established below, the magistrate did not abuse his discretion by 
dismissing the Petition. 
The decision to issue a writ of habeas corpus is a matter within the discretion of the 
magistrate court. Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123, 127; Brennan v. State, 122 Idaho 911,914. If 
a petitioner is not entitled to relief on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the decision of the 
lower comi to dismiss the petition without an evidentiaiy hearing will be upheld. Brennan, 122 
Idaho at 917. 
In Craig v. State, 123 Idaho 121,844 P.2d 1371 (Ct. App. 1992), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the Parole Commission's decision that a parole violation had occurred "will 
not be overturned unless the reviewing court can say that the finding represents an abuse of 
discretion." Craig, 123 Idaho 121, 126. "An abuse of discretion will occur only if the finding of 
a violation is not supported by substantial reliable evidence or if the procedures followed deprive 
the parolee of due process." Id. 
The statute relevant to the present case is Idaho Code § 20-229B, which provides in 
pertinent part that "[i]f the ... hearing officer ... should conclude that the allegations of violation 
of the conditions of parole have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and constitute 
sufficient cause for the revocation of parole, then a dispositional hearing shall be convened 
during a regular session of the commission to execute an order of parole revocation." As 
correctly observed by the court in Craig: 
The statute has two components, one factual, the other discretionary. The 
threshold issue before the Commission is a question of fact. A violation of the 
conditions of parole must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The 
second step involves the exercise of the Commission's discretion based on the 
factual results of the first inquiry. 
123 Idaho at 124 (emphasis added). The court then elaborated on the Commission's factual inquiry: 
It is the state's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all facts 
necessary to show the parolee violated a condition of his parole. "By a 
preponderance of the evidence is meant such evidence as, when weighed with that 
opposed to it, has more convincing force and from which it results the greater 
probability of truth lies therein." Where the Commission finds upon any 
substantial evidence in the record that a fact has been proven, the finding will not 
be disturbed. Where there is conflicting evidence in the record, of a substantial 
nature, on a given point of fact, the Commission shall be the sole arbiter of the 
weight to be given to the evidence, that is, whether a fact has been proven by a 
--~8. ______ _ 
"preponderance of the evidence." Thus, where there is substantial although 
disputed evidence in the record before the Commission to support a finding that 
the alleged violation did occur, that finding will not be overturned by the 
reviewing court. 
Id. at 125 ( emphasis added; citations omitted). 
Nonetheless, Matthews misconstrues the role of the magistrate when reviewing the Parole 
Commission's decision. That role is simply to determine whether the Parole Commission abused 
its discretion in making its decision. Craig, 123 Idaho 121, 126. In making this determination, it 
is critical to bear in mind that "the Commission shall be the sole arbiter of the weight to be given 
to the evidence, that is, whether a fact has been proven by a 'preponderance of the evidence'." 
Craig, 123 Idaho at 125. In other words, resolving disputed issues of fact was solely within the 
domain of the Commission. However, Matthews continues to argue that the magistrate should 
have resolved those disputed factual issues in his favor and denied summary judgment, and then 
should have held an evidentiary hearing. However, Idaho's well-established caselaw precludes 
such an outcome. 
Unlike an ordinary summary judgment proceeding, the magistrate was sitting in a 
reviewing capacity, rather than as a trial court. The magistrate's only role was to determine 
whether the Parole Commission abused its discretion. On appeal, the district court recognized 
that the magistrate properly understood his role, when the district court stated: "I reiterate with 
emphasis Judge Robinson's conclusion that his sole role was to decide ifthere was substantial 
evidence to support the hearing officer's findings. (R., pp. 228-229) (citing Craig v. State, 123 
Idaho at 125; emphasis in original). As long as there was substantial (although disputed) 
--~--··-·------ '" 
evidence to suppmi the Parole Commission's decision, the magistrate was bound to affirm that 
decision. Instead of accepting this outcome, Matthews argues that those same factual disputes 
that allegedly existed before the Parole Commission should have precluded summary judgment. 
However, those factual disputes have already been resolved and it is was not the magistrate's 
position to substitute his own judgment for that of the Parole Commission. The record in this 
case clearly shows that the magistrate properly understood his role on review and properly 
exercised his discretion in dismissing Matthews' Petition. 
First, the Magistrate properly stated the applicable standard ofreview. (R., pp. 179-180.) 
At the April 16, 2007 Summary Judgment Hearing, the Magistrate clearly demonstrated that he 
understood and was applying the appropriate standard. Specifically, the Court stated: 
Mr. Matthews was given full opportunity at his factual hearing to show why he 
failed to comply with these conditions. He offered his reason, and it was rejected. 
And for me to then conduct a full hearing again it just does seem to me, Mr. Van 
ldour, that you're asking me to weigh the evidence once again and give Mr. 
Matthews a de novo hearing and I don't see any authority for me to conduct a de 
novo hearing. 
That's where again the review is not a de novo review. That is, it's very limited. 
That when it comes to a parole commissions hearing decision, whether there 
exists substantial evidence and that means evidence that a reasonable person 
could rely upon, and it seems to me that if you have written conditions that Mr. 
Matthews violates, that's a reasonable basis to find a violation of his parole. And 
a factual hearing would merely cause me to re-hear the very same evidence that 
the Parole Commission has already reviewed and found in its wisdom to 
constitute a basis for the parole revocation. 
That when I look at each of the allegations or the violations there is a basis for 
that, and that's what I have to find, whether or not there was a basis for the 
decision. Not whether it's a decision I would have issued or would have agreed 
to, but rather instead on whether there's a basis for it. 
(Tr., p. 29, L. 21-p. 31, L. 13.) 
Next, the magistrate conducted a detailed review of each alleged parole violation and 
determined that substantial evidence supported the Parole Commission's decision that Matthews 
violated multiple conditions of his parole. (R., pp. 181-187.) Likewise, in reviewing the 
magistrate's decision, the district court stated that "Judge Robinson meticulously reviewed each 
violation and concluded there was substantial evidence to support each of them." (R., p. 227.) 
The district court then accurately summarized the magistrate's role in reviewing the Parole 
Commission's decision as follows: "The issue is not whether the magistrate would have made 
the same findings based on evidence adduced at the hearing. Rather, the issue is whether or not 
the evidence that was adduced was sufficient to warrant the hearing officer's findings." (R., p. 
228.) The record is clear that the magistrate applied the appropriate standard ofreview in 
reaching his decision, and there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Parole 
Commission's decision. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in granting summary 
judgment to Respondents. 
B. The Parole Revocation Proceedings Did Not Violate Matthews' Right To Due Process. 
Matthews argues that his right to due process in the course of the parole revocation 
proceedings was violated. Specifically, Matthews contends that his right to due process was 
violated I) because he did not receive the hearing officer's report within twenty (20) days 
following his hearing; 2) because he was not allowed to cross examine witnesses at the 
revocation hearing; and 3) because the Parole Commission did not audio-record its hearings. As 
properly determined by the magistrate and district court, Matthews' due process rights were not 
violated during the parole revocation process. 
1. The delay in receiving the hearing officer's report did not violate Matthews' 
right to due process. 
Matthews' parole violation hearing was held on October 21, 2005. (R., p. 93.) The 
hearing officer's written report was issued on January 3, 2006. (Id.) Matthews alleges that he 
did not receive the hearing officer's report until January 25, 2006. (Id., p. 5.) According to 
Matthews, because he did not receive the hearing officer's report within twenty (20) days as 
required by Idaho Code § 20-229B, his right to due process was violated. 
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the United States Supreme Court 
determined that a parolee was entitled to limited due process in the course of parole revocation. 
However, the Court cautioned "that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution 
and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole 
revocations." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. The Court then explained that parole revocation 
proceedings should consist of two stages: l) a "preliminary hearing" to determine whether there 
is probable cause that a parole violation occun-ed; and 2) a "revocation hearing" to determine 
whether parole should be revoked. Id. at 485. 
Consistent with Morrissey, an alleged parole violator is entitled to a "preliminary 
hearing" before a hearing officer selected by the executive director of the Parole Commission. 
Idaho Code § 20-229. The hearing officer is supposed to issue her decision within twenty (20) 
days after the hearing is concluded. Idaho Code§ 20-229B. Matthews alleges that he did not 
receive the hearing officer's report within the statutory time frame and therefore he was denied 
due process. 
In dismissing this portion of Matthews' due process claim, the magistrate relied on Loomis 
v. Killeen, 135 Idaho 607, 21 P.3d 929 (Ct. App. 2001), in concluding that Matthews "fail[ed] to 
argue how the additional delay caused any harm or reached constitutional dimensions." (R., p. 
190.) In that case, Loomis was aiTested on a parole violation but did not receive his preliminary 
hearing until thirty-eight (38) days after bis arrest. On appeal, the court determined that this delay 
violated Loomis' due process rights as outlined in Morrissey. Loomis, 135 ldaho at 610. However, 
the court explained that "[w]hen a parolee has not been afforded a timely preliminary hearing, the 
appropriate remedy generally is a release of the parolee from incarceration until such a hearing is 
conducted." Id. at 612. Therefore, the court concluded: 
By the time the magistrate acted on the petition, Loomis had received the requisite 
preliminary hearing at which probable cause for bis incarceration was found, as well 
as subsequent hearings where the parole violation was found to have occurred and 
parole revocation was ordered. Thus, Loomis was no longer entitled to release from 
custody. 
Id. at 613 (footnote omitted). 
The Magistrate's Order clearly demonstrates that the magistrate properly applied Loomis to 
the facts of this case. (R., pp. l 90-192.) In this case, there was no prejudice to Matthews. As 
detailed by the magistrate, Matthews (who was represented by counsel) requested and received 
multiple continuances throughout the revocation proceedings. (R., p. 191.) Therefore, to the extent 
there was any delay in the process, it was self-imposed. Furthermore, Matthews received the 
hearing officer's repmi well before the date of the revocation hearing. 
2. Matthews did not have a due process right to cross-examine witnesses at the 
final revocation hearing. 
Matthews contends that his due process rights were violated because he was not allowed 
to cross-examine any witnesses at the final revocation hearing. As explained below, the 
magistrate properly concluded that Matthews received the due process to which he was entitled. 
In Morrissey, the Court explained that parole revocation proceedings should consist of 
two stages: 1) a "preliminary hearing" to detem1ine whether there is probable cause that a parole 
violation occurred; and 2) a "revocation hearing" to detem1ine whether parole should be revoked. 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485. With respect to the preliminary hearing, the Court stated that the 
parolee "may appear and speak in his own behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or 
individuals who can give relevant information to the hearing officer. On request of the parolee, 
[a] person who has given adverse information on which parole revocation is to be based is to be 
made available for questioning in his presence." Id. at 487. Although the Court recognized a 
limited right to cross-examine witnesses, that right exists only during the preliminary or fact-
finding stage of the proceedings. It does not exist at the revocation or disposition hearing. See 
id. at 488. In making this determination, the Court "emphasize[ d] there is no thought to equate 
this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense." id. at 489. 
Furthermore, the Court stated that it was each state's responsibility to develop its own 
specific procedures for parole revocation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488. There is nothing in 
Idaho's parole statutes or the Parole Commission's rules that require the Commission to allow 
cross-examination at the final revocation hearing. But see IDAPA 50.01.0l.400.03(c) (allowing 
cross-examination at the fact-finding hearing). As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Under the Commission's procedures, a parole revocation proceeding consists of 
two parts; a fact-finding (parole violation) hearing, where the Commission 
determines the parolee's guilt or innocence of the alleged parole violations, and a 
revocation hearing, where the Commission reviews the alleged charges, the 
testimony presented, and the findings on each alleged violation. IDAP A 
50.0l.0l.650.08(a),(b); Chapman, 11 I Idaho.at 151, 721 P.2d at 1250. It is 
during the revocation hearing that the Commission determines whether parole will 
be revoked. IDAPA 50.0l.Ol.650.08(b). During the parole violation hearing, the 
alleged parole violator has the right to (1) written notice of the violations as 
charged, at least 24 hours prior to the hearing, (2) disclosure of the evidence 
against him, (3) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and 
documentary evidence, (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, unless good cause is found for not allowing such confrontation, (5) a 
neutral and detached hearing body, and (6) a summary of all testimony and a 
written statement of the findings on each alleged violation, stating the evidence 
relied upon. IDAPA 50.0l.01.650.08(a)(i-vi). 
Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 772, 918 P.2d 1213 (1996) (emphasis added). 
As concluded by the court, "[t]he procedures and requirements promulgated by the Commission 
for parole revocation proceedings, follow the procedures and requirements set forth in 
Morrissey." Id. 1 
The magistrate properly recognized that Matthews' limited right to cross examination did 
not extend to the final revocation hearing. (R., pp. 188-190.) Specifically, the magistrate 
pointed out that "[t]he parole revocation hearing is a disposition hearing that is held after the due 
process hearing is concluded." (R., pp. 188-189.) Furthermore, Matthews "was afforded the full 
1 Respondents recognize that Smith was based on a review of a fonner version of the Parole 
Commission's administrative rules. However, the current version of the Parole Commission's 
rules compels the same conclusion. See IDAPA 50.01.01.400. 
panoply of due process at this evidentiary hearing including the right of cross-examination and 
representation by an attorney." (R., p. 189.) 
Specifically, Matthews was represented by counsel at the revocation hearing. (R., p. 
129.) Petitioner's attorney had the opportunity to address the Parole Commission, and in fact did 
so. (Id.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Parole Commission adopted the findings of the 
hearing officer and elected to revoke Petitioner's parole. (R., pp. 130-135.) In reaching its 
decision, the Parole Commission expressly stated that its decision to revoke parole was "based 
solely on the findings of the Hearing Officer, not on testimony from any witnesses at this 
Revocation Hearing." (R., p. 136.) 
Additionally, Matthews' attorney actually cross-examined the parole officer and at least one 
witness at the fact-finding hearing. (See R., pp. 96, 98-99, I 04.) Therefore, contrary to Matthews' 
claim, he was able to cross-examine the same people who were present at the revocation hearing. 
Also, Matthews' mother and brother were present at the fact-finding hearing. (R., p. 93.) In sum, 
the same witnesses were present at both the fact-finding and revocation hearings. Matthews was 
represented by counsel at both hearings. Counsel was allowed to cross-examine witnesses at the 
fact-finding hearing. Likewise, witnesses allegedly favorable to Matthews were present at the fact-
finding hearing and able to present testimony on his behalf Simply stated, Matthews was afforded 
the due process to which he was entitled. 
3, The Parole Commission is not required to record its hearings. 
The last aspect of Matthews' due process claim is his contention that his rights were 
violated because the Parole Commission did not audio record the revocation proceedings. 
Appellant's Brief; p. 27. As explained below, this claim lacks merit. 
Before Matthews may assert an issue on appeal, he must obtain an adverse ruling on that 
issue from the trial court. State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942 (1993) ("We will 
not review a trial cowt's alleged e1Tor on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling 
which forms the basis for the assignment of error."); State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27 
( 1988) (Idaho Supreme Court would not review claim where appellant had not obtained ruling 
from trial comi); State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 276-77, 678 P.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1984) (failure to 
obtain a ruling on an issue below prevents appellate review absent showing of fundamental 
error). Because Matthews failed to obtain an adverse ruling from the magistrate regarding the 
lack of audio taped revocation hearings, he is precluded from raising the issue on appea!.2 
Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that Matthews raised the issue on appeal to the 
district comi. 
Even assuming that Matthews properly preserved the issue for appeal, it is nonetheless 
without merit. There is nothing in Morrissey, Idaho statutes regarding parole revocation, or the 
2 Although Matthews' counsel mentioned the lack of recorded hearings during the April 16, 
2007 hearing before the magistrate, Matthews never obtained an adverse ruling on the issue. 
(See Tr., p. 21, L. 25-p. 22, L. 12.) 
Parole Commission's rules that require the Parole Commission to record its hearings. Therefore, 
the absence of a recorded hearing did not violate Matthews' due process rights. 
C. The Revocation Of Matthews' Parole Did Not Violate His Rights Against Double 
Jeopardy or Cruel and Unusual Punishment. 
Matthews alleges that his rights against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual 
punishment were violated when the Parole Commission relied on his past conduct as a basis for 
revoking parole; and that by forfeiting his parole time, the Parole Commission unlawfully 
extended his sentence. 
Matthews essentially argues that because he had already been sanctioned for past conduct 
while on parole, the Parole Commission was forbidden from taking that past behavior into 
account when deciding to revoke his parole. See Appellant's Brief, p. 17. In rejecting this claim, 
the magistrate explained: "Accepting Petitioner's argument, the State would be limited to 
considering limited discrete acts separate from other past acts. Violations of parole would have 
to be ignored once subject to sanction. Nothing in due process or the Eighth Amendment 
requires such hamstringing of the Parole Commission." (R., p. 193.) Throughout this action, 
Matthews has failed to provide any authority in support of this claim. Instead, he relies upon his 
own conclusory statements. 
As summarized by Matthews' parole officer, his parole violation was based on "[t]he whole 
of these violations, exhibited over an extended period of time, demonstrate a lack of regard for rules 
and the privilege of parole that has been granted him by the Commission." (R., p. 65.) Based on 
these circumstances, it was appropriate for the parole officer to initiate revocation proceedings. The 
absence of a new and particular violation does not invalidate that decision. There is nothing in the 
parole statutes or Parole Commission administrative rules that prohibits evaluating a parolee's 
history on parole when considering whether or not to revoke parole. In fact, a parolee may be 
arrested "[wlhenever the commission finds that a parolee may have violated the conditions of 
parole." Idaho Code§ 20-228 (emphasis added). Additionally, Matthews was put on notice that 
past violations could be used against him in future violation proceedings. (See R., p. 49.) Because 
there is no time limit for initiating a report of violation, nor is there any requirement of a "new" 
violation, Matthews' claim is without merit. 
Matthews also claims that the forfeiture of his parole time had the effect of lengthening 
his sentence in violation of his rights against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 23. In rejecting this claim, the magistrate, relying on Gibson v. Bennett, 141 
Idaho 270, l 08 P.3d 417 (Ct. App. 2005), properly held: 
Upon release from prison, Petitioner will have served approximately twenty-two 
(22) years in !DOC custody. Compared to the potential punishment of life 
imprisonment, this length of time is not so "out of proportion to the gravity of the 
offense committed and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable people." 
Gibson, 141 Idaho at 275 (citation omitted). Therefore, Petitioner's argument is 
rejected. 
With respect to Petitioner's claim that the double jeopardy clause was violated, 
"the violation of the terms of parole is not a separate punishment for Gibson's 
underlying criminal offenses." Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho at 276. Therefore, 
the double jeopardy clause is not violated. 
(R., p. I 94.) Matthews fails to establish that the magistrate committed an error in this ruling. 
Likewise, Matthews fails to meaningfully distinguish his claims from the ones rejected by the 
court in Gibson. Accordingly, the magistrate properly dismissed Matthews' double jeopardy and 
cruel and unusual claims. 
D. Matthews Can Not Present An Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim In This Appeal. 
Matthews attempts to raise a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim in 
this appeal. Appellant's Brief, p. 29. As explained below, this claim is inappropriate and 
without merit. 
A habeas corpus action is a civil proceeding. Idaho Code § 19-4208. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has held there is no right to appointment of counsel in habeas corpus cases. Quinlan v. 
Idaho Comm 'nfor Pardons and Paroles, 138 ldaho 726, 69 P.3d 146 (2003). Because there is 
no right to counsel in a habeas corpus case, Matthews can not assert an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. 
Even if Matthews had a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it would be 
inappropriate for him to raise the issue in this appeal. 
The question of competency of counsel is an extremely complex factual 
determination which, in all but the most unusual cases, requires an evidentiary 
hearing for determination. The resolution of those factual issues for the first time 
upon appeal, based upon the trial record in which competency of counsel was not 
at issue, is at best conjectural. 
Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791, 702 P.2d 826 (1985) (quoting State v. Kraft, 96 Idaho 901, 
906, 539 P.2d 254 (1975) (concurring opinion of Bakes, J.)). Where ineffective assistance of 
counsel is raised as an issue in a direct appeal, absent established facts to the contrary, "it must 
be presumed that defense counsel's actions were not due to inadequate preparation or ignorance, 
and that defendant's representation by counsel was competently carried out." State v. Carter, 
---·--~·2Q ............. . 
103 Idaho 917,923,655 P.2d 434 (1982). Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court and court of 
appeals have repeatedly warned it is generally inappropriate to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Parrot v. State, 117 Idaho 272, 274, 787 P.2d 258 (1990); 
Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 792; Krqfi v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 672-73, 603 P.2d 1005 
(1979); State v. Gomez, 127 Idaho 327,329,900 P.2d 803 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Marks, 119 
Idaho 64, 66,803 P.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Steele, 118 Idaho 793,795,800 P.2d 680; 
State v. Munoz, 118 Idaho 742,745,800 P.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 
516,523, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1985). The present case is no different. Therefore, Matthews' 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is inappropriate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that this Court affirm 
the district court's decision affirming the magistrate's dismissal of Matthews' Petition . 
. --,uft-. 
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